隱私與自主: 從Warren and Brandeis到Roe and Cruzan

Privacy and Autonomy: From Warren and Brandeis to Roe and Cruzan

Authors

  • Thomas HALPER Baruch College & The CUUNy Graduate School, USA

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.21370

Keywords:

墮胎, 自主, Charles Warren, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, Griswold v. Connecticut, In re Quinlan, Louis Brandeis, 隱私, 求死的權利, Roe v. Wade, 最高法院

Abstract

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese

Warren and Brandeis 有關侵犯隱私權之訴訟，有一個主要是社會性目標：獲得法院的同情，強化文明的規範。多年以後，在Griswold v. Connecticut（1965）的案例裏，最高法院宣示以個人為焦點的一項隱私的憲法權利。在這個及往後有關墮胎及「死之權利」的判例裏，即顯然看出，Warren and Brandeis 那種維多利亞式的「不受打擾的權利」（the right to be let alone）已變形為自主的權利，其多種變形使得加以預測甚至是描述，都成為棘手的事。然而，隱私乃是自主的一項不充分的代理（an unsatisfactory proxy for autonomy），也許正因為如此，其作為這些領域中的根據之重要性，已然縮減。

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Published

1999-01-01

How to Cite

HALPER, T. (1999). 隱私與自主: 從Warren and Brandeis到Roe and Cruzan: Privacy and Autonomy: From Warren and Brandeis to Roe and Cruzan. International Journal of Chinese &Amp; Comparative Philosophy of Medicine, 2(2), 95–112. https://doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.21370

Issue

Vol. 2 No. 2 (1999)

Section

Articles

License

Copyright (c) 1999 International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine

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