莊子的生命自由觀及其生命倫理學意義

Zhuangzi, Life, and Daoist Bioethics

Authors

  • 李紅文 (Hongwen LI) 中國北京大學 (Peking University, CHINA)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.61463

Keywords:

莊子, 生命, 自由, 無待, 自主性, 平等, 死亡

Abstract

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.

莊子的生命自由觀是一種用自由來定義生命的哲學觀念,其核心內容是追求無待的絕對自由觀,以“吾喪我”來消解人的主體意識、“齊萬物”的平等精神,以及同生死的觀念。無待的自由是指一種絕對的、不依賴於外在條件的自由,它體現為無己、無功和無名。“無待”的主旨就是超越主觀和客觀的對立,超越有限的自我,達到無限而自由的自我。“喪我”便是摒棄偏執的我、固執的我。這個偏執的“我”是封閉的我,是假我;喪失了“我”的“吾”才是開放的我,才是拋棄了偏執的本真之我。莊子的“吾喪我”乃是一種消解主體意識的方式,超越了西方主體哲學的主觀和客觀的二元對立模式。“齊物論”闡發的是平等思想,它包括三個方面:即物物平等、人人平等、人與萬物平等。莊子認為人的生死是自然世界中的一個普通事件,人的身體乃是由外在物質世界元素(氣)假借而成,只是暫時的湊集,終究是要滅亡的。這些哲學觀念對中國生命倫理學的建構具有重要的意義,主要表現在:消解人的主體性和自主性,以區別於西方生命倫理學尊重自主性原則;物物平等、人人平等以及人與萬物平等的思想對生命倫理學提出了更高的要求;以貴生、養生的方法來善待生命,反對對生命的強干涉主義。

Freedom is a key concept in the philosophy of Zhuangzi. This kind of freedom requires a deconstruction of the “subject…predicate” logic and an attitude that views all things equally. The ethical views of Zhuangzi focus on the notion of “losing oneself” or “forgetting oneself”, the purpose of which is to subvert the position between subject and object and to see things as they are. Unlike the Western idea of individual autonomy, Zhuangzi’s concept of freedom is based on the interconnectedness between individuals. This essay contends that the Daoist position on the meaning of human life and freedom can serve as a source of inspiration when we consider the many bioethical issues we face today—including the issue of life and death—and how to interpret those issues within the Chinese context.

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Published

2008-01-01

How to Cite

LI, H. (2008). 莊子的生命自由觀及其生命倫理學意義: Zhuangzi, Life, and Daoist Bioethics. International Journal of Chinese &Amp; Comparative Philosophy of Medicine, 6(2), 53–73. https://doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.61463

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Articles