Can We Biotechnologically Construct a Morally Better Human?

我們能通過生物技術構建更為完善的人類嗎？

Abstract

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in English ; abstract also in Chinese.

在西方與東方的哲學和宗教思想中，人類尋求道德上的提升有著悠久傳統。然而，一些生命倫理學家認為，在面臨可能導致人類滅絕或近乎滅絕的重大威脅時——例如核戰、環境破壞及迅速擴大的社會經濟差距等，傳統的道德提升方法顯得不足。因此，他們常基於美德倫理學，提出通過促進和利用生物技術介入來改變人類道德行動者的認知和情感能力以及性情，以作為傳統方法的替代或補充。本文將比較分析如亞里士多德的德性理論中所推薦的在家庭和更廣泛的社會中進行道德教育等傳統的間接的道德增強手段，以及如藥物、神經刺激或基因介入等直接的生物技術手段。可通過生物技術進行操作的認知和情感因素包括：資訊處理和推理、記憶、認知偏見、侵襲性、仇外、自我中心主義、共情或同情、誠實、團結、和諧、利他主義、感恩、公平、羞愧、寛恕及對誘惑的抵抗。我們提出了幾個關於直接生物技術方法的憂慮，例如他們對自主性、真實性和能動性的潛在影響，並呼籲通過有意社會設計來增強道德教育的傳統方法，以引導行動者作出更好的道德決策和培養美德性情。我們認為某些生物技術的道德增強方法能夠在不損害個體能動性、自主性與真實性的前提下，通過協調其一階與二階欲望，從而克服意志薄弱的問題。然而，即便從原則上存在支持甚至鼓勵道德生物增強的依據，但一旦這類技術手段進入公開市場，仍會面臨諸多或難逾越的現實挑戰：其一，需開展相關倫理研究以推動這類生物技術干預手段的開發；其二，要確保最能從中獲益的群體能以非隱蔽、非脅迫的方式獲取該技術；其三，必須保障此類干預手段能有效促使個體在認知與情感層面的道德傾向產生穩定且積極的轉變。

The quest to morally enhance human beings has a long tradition in both Western and Eastern philosophical and religious thought. Yet some bioethicists have argued that traditional approaches to moral enhancement are inadequate in the face of threats such as nuclear war, environmental devastation, and exponentially increasing socio-economic gaps, which may result in the extinction or near-extinction of humankind. Often using the language of virtue ethics, they have thus promoted the development and utilisation of biotechnological interventions to alter human moral agents’ cognitive and emotive capacities and dispositions as either a replacement for or a complement to traditional approaches to moral enhancement. In this article, we analytically compare traditional indirect means of moral enhancement, such as moral education within families and wider societies, as recommended within Aristotelian virtue theory, with direct biotechnological means such as pharmaceutical, neurostimulatory, or genetic interventions. Cognitive and emotive factors that may be amenable to biotechnological manipulation include information processing and reasoning, memory, cognitive biases, aggression, xenophobia, ego-centredness, empathy/sympathy, truthfulness, solidarity, agreeableness, altruism, gratitude, fairness, shame, forgiveness, and resistance to temptation. We raise several concerns with respect to direct biotechnological methods, such as their potential harmful impact on autonomy, authenticity, and agency, and call for the enhancement of traditional methods of moral education by devising more intentional social designs to nudge agents towards better moral decision-making and the cultivation of virtuous dispositions. Nevertheless, we contend that certain biotechnological methods of moral enhancement could facilitate – without undermining – individuals’ agency, autonomy, and authenticity by aligning their first- and second-order desires to overcome the moral ‘weakness of will’ problem. However, even if there are principled reasons to allow, or even encourage, moral bioenhancement, various practical concerns could prove insurmountable if such means were made available on the open market, including the need for ethical research to develop these biotechnological interventions; the need to ensure their accessibility to those who would most benefit, without covertness or coercion; and the need to ensure their effectiveness in creating stable, positive alterations to an agent’s cognitive and emotive moral disposition.